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In the Brief of Appellee Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), the 
Commission confuses in its argument two entirely separate principles. The 
Commission would have the often used inquiry "in lieu of what were the damages 
awarded" to answer the question of whether taxing jurisdiction exists, rather than its 
proper use, one which is not at issue in this case, to answer the question of whether 
income is taxable and, if so, how? This fundamental error must be rejected as 
inconsistent not only with the Utah statutes that extend taxing jurisdiction to non-
residents in extremely limited circumstances, but also as in conflict with due process of 
law, the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENT ABOUT THE CHARACTER AND NATURE OF THE 
MANDELLS' 2001 INCOME FAILS TO ADDRESS WHETHER UTAH HAS TAXING 
JURISDICTION OVER THE MANDELLS IN 2001- IT PLAINLY DOES NOT. 
The Commission's argument in Point I of its Brief that it correctly determined the 
character and nature of the proceeds leaves the question open as to what it in fact 
determined. Nothing in Point I identifies the determination to which the Commission 
refers. The Commission quotes the determination in Pennzoil Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 33 P.3d 314 (Ore. 2001), that "Pennzoil received the settlement proceeds 
[from Texaco] in lieu of its agreement with Getty and that the agreement gave rise to 
the disputed income." Id. at 317. What the Commission overlooks, however, is that in 
the tax year at issue, 1988, Pennzoil was conducting business within the state of 
Oregon. Id. at 316 ("Pennzoil's only activity in Oregon during the 1988 tax year was the 
operation of a facility designed to blend, package, and distribute motor oil and related 
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automotive products.") 
It is an important point, so bears repeating- Pennzoil was physically present 
within the state of Oregon during the tax year in question. Here, in contrast, the 
Mandells had no presence within Utah at any time during the tax year in question. See 
FOF If 30 (Tor the tax year in question, 2001, [the Mandells] were no longer Utah 
resident individuals for state income tax purposes."). R. 44. Significantly, the 
Commission also made no finding that the Mandells maintained any commercial 
domicile within Utah during 2001, the tax year in question. The undisputed testimony, 
including the concessions by Mr. Taylor on behalf of the Auditing Division, that Mr. 
Mandell did not have a commercial domicile in the state of Utah for tax year 2001, 
within the meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-103(1 )(d) (Tr. 129:1-1 8), would have 
precluded any such finding. 
Had Mr. Whitworth honestly reported the value of HOA to the Mandells in 1998, 
they would have demanded (and received) a larger purchase price from Champion in 
1998 for their shares. But, unlike Pennzoil, which was present in Oregon when it 
received its settlement proceeds, the Mandells had long previously departed Utah for 
Nevada, as they have the privilege to do without being subjected to further Utah tax. 
Since Pennzoil was present within Oregon at the time it received the settlement 
proceeds, it was subject to unitary taxation principles. See Pennzoil, 33 P.3d at 545. 
Once it is established that a corporation is present within a state and subject to 
unitary taxation, the essential inquiry then becomes whether the income is 
apportionable to the taxing state, as business income. See id. at 546. It is in that 
context that the "character and nature" inquiry became relevant to taxation in Pennzoil. 
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Since the Mandells had no domicile or commercial residence within Utah during 
2001, the tax year in question, the inquiry is immaterial, as least as to the state of Utah, 
which has no taxing jurisdiction. The inquiry is pertinent only to whether the Mandells 
may sustain their claim of capital gains treatment on their federal income tax return. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENT THAT THE MANDELLS MUST MARSHALL EVIDENCE 
FAILS BECAUSE THE MANDELLS DO NOT CHALLENGE ANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
There is no question that if the Mandells had challenged a finding of fact, that 
they would have been subject to the requirement that they marshall all evidence in 
support of the challenged finding. See Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 
(Utah 1988). The Mandells have not challenged, however, a single finding. The 
marshalling requirement therefore does not apply at all. 
The Commission's argument is that the Mandells are challenging Conclusion of 
Law No. 2, which states: "2. As the amount of the litigation proceeds are in lieu of 
funds that Mr. Mandell should have received at the time he was a Utah resident and 
had sold the stock in his Utah business, the funds are taxable as Utah Source income 
pursuant to Utah Code Sees. 59-10-116, 117 & 118." R. 47. The Commission then 
argues that, although Conclusion No. 2 is not designated as a Finding of Fact that it 
really should be considered as one. Setting aside the lack of notice issues that such a 
late shift would cause with respect to any marshalling requirement, Conclusion No. 2 is 
plainly a conclusion. There has never been a question that, had Mr. Whitworth been 
honest, the agreement between the Mandells and Champion would have contained a 
higher price for the Mandells' stock. The conclusion that the income in a subsequent 
year, derived from litigating a fraud claim, at a time when the Mandells have no physical 
presence in Utah, when the findings state that they are domiciled in Nevada and when 
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the findings are silent on whether a commercial domicile exists in Utah, but as to which 
the testimony is uncontroverted and Mr. Taylor from the Auditing Division conceded that 
the Mandells had no commercial domicile in Utah, is erroneous as a matter of law. 
There is nothing to marshall. 
The Commission cites to UTAH CODE ANN. 59-10-116, to -118, but left out any 
discussion of the requirements of section 117 to include income as Utah source 
income. Section 117 sets forth what can be included in adjusted gross income for 
nonresidents, as set forth in pertinent part: 
Adjusted Gross Income derived from Utah sources 
(1) For purposes of Section 59-10-116, adjusted gross income derived from Utah 
sources includes those items includable in adjusted gross income attributable to 
or resulting from: 
(b) the carrying on of a business, trade, profession, or occupation in this 
state. 
(2) For the purposes of Subsection (1): 
(a) Income from intangible personal property, including annuities, 
dividends, interest, and gains from the disposition of intangible personal 
property shall constitute income derived from Utah sources only to the 
extent that such income is from property employed in a trade, business, 
profession, or occupation carried on in this state;... 
UTAH CODE ANN. §59-10-117(1), (2)(a) (emphasis added). Finding No. 8 establishes 
that Mr. Mandell performed no services within Utah for HAU after 1999 ("8. Mr. Mandell 
managed HAU from its date of incorporation and the Mandells were residents of Utah 
from 1995 to March of 1999.") R. 41. In 1999, the Mandells "changed their domicile 
and permanently moved to the state of Nevada in 1999. For the tax year in question, 
2001, they were no longer Utah resident individuals for state income tax purposes." 
Finding No. 30. R. 44. There is no finding whatsoever that either of the Mandells, 
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themselves, "carr[ied] on Q a business, trade, profession, or occupation in this statef,]" 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-117(1), in 2001, or that either of them received "income Q from 
property employed in a trade, business, profession, or occupation carried on in this 
statef,]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-117(2)(a), in 2001, as is required by the statutes so 
as to tax the income. Section 116 of the Code expressly limits Utah's income tax 
percentage to a nonresident's "percentage equal to a nonresident individual's adjusted 
gross income for the taxable year received from Utah sources, as determined under 
Section 59-10-117, divided by the difference between:..." UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-
116(c). Where the Utah source income is zero, the Utah income tax percentage is 
zero. 
Section 118 also excludes the Mandells' 2001 income from any possibility of 
Utah taxation. "Business income" means "income arising from transactions and activity 
in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from 
tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the 
property constitutes integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business 
operations." UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-118(1 )(a). There is no Finding that the Mandells 
earned any income in 2001 as the result of transactions and activity in the regular 
course of the taxpayer's trade, so the Mandells had no business income in Utah in 
2001. "'Commercial domicile' means the principal place from which the trade or 
business of the taxpayer is directed or managed." UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-118(1 )(b). 
There is no Finding that the Mandells had any commercial domicile within Utah in 2001. 
Notably, the Utah Code states that "[c]apital gains and losses from sales of intangible 
personal property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in 
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this state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-118(5)(c). Although there is no finding about a 
commercial domicile for the Mandells, Mr. Taylor, of the Auditing Division, conceded 
that the Mandells had no commercial domicile within Utah in the tax year at issue, 2001. 
Tr. at 129:1-18. "Stocks" fall squarely under the definition of "intangible property" in the 
Property Tax Code. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-102(19)(a)(iv). So even if the character 
and nature of the Mandells' income received in 2001 had been determined, by a 
Finding, to be capital gain from the sale of stock, and the Commission made no such 
Finding, where there is no Finding that the Mandells had a commercial domicile in Utah 
in 2001, and there is no such Finding, the statute itself would not allow taxation of any 
2001 capital gain from the sale of stock to the state of Utah. 
Of course, the Commission not only did not make a Finding that stock was sold 
in 2001, it plainly recognized the reality that the Mandells' 2001 income came from the 
settlement of a chose in action. See Finding Nos. 31-34, R44-45 (describing the chose 
in action and the action filed in Nevada based on the chose in action). The 
Commission also entered its Finding that the settlement of the chose in action directly 
led to the Mandells' receipt of income in 2001. Finding No. 35, R.45. Although the 
Commission found that such income resulted in the Mandells having received capital 
gain income from the sale of their stock, id., a position the Mandells took with the IRS, 
see Finding No. 36, R.45, such Finding does not alter the fact that there is no Finding 
and no basis for any Finding that the Mandells had a commercial domicile in Utah in 
2001, as is required for capital gain income from the sale of stock, received in 2001, to 
be taxable to Utah in 2001. 
Because the Mandells do not challenge any Finding, marshalling is not required. 
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Because the Commission did not and could not, on the record before it, enter any 
Finding that the Mandells had a commercial domicile in Utah in 2001 or earned any 
business income in Utah in 2001, the decision must be reversed, based strictly on the 
Utah statutes, themselves. This simply confirms the common law rule the Mandells 
cited in their Opening Brief, that the chose in action held by the Mandells was domiciled 
where the taxpayer was domiciled. In 2001, there was no connection between the state 
of Utah and the income received from the chose in action, regardless of the fact that it 
may be capital gain income. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN UTAH 
SOURCE INCOME IN 1998, WHEN THE MANDELLS WERE DOMICILED IN UTAH, 
IGNORES THE UTAH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH SOURCE INCOME FOR 
THE TAX YEAR A T ISSUE, 2001. 
All of the Mandells' income in 1998 was Utah Source income. They were 
domiciled in Utah and they worked within and earned money within the state of Utah in 
1998. In 2001, the Mandells were not domiciled in Utah, did not earn a living in Utah, 
owned no property in Utah and had no connection whatsoever to Utah. There is not a 
Finding that suggests otherwise. 
Despite its own inability to enter any such Finding, the Commission argues that 
an election made by the Mandells during 1998, to treat the sale of stock in 1998 as 
though it were an asset sale, under 26 U.S.C. § 338(h)(10), subjects the Mandells to 
the continuing taxing jurisdiction of the state of Utah in later years. But the tax year in 
question is 2001. The target company of the acquisition, HAU, was not doing business 
in Utah in 2001 and no Finding exists to suggest otherwise. HAU could not receive 
income in 2001 and no Finding exists to suggest that it could or did. HAU could not 
issue K-1s in 2001 and no Finding exists to suggest that it could or did. Finally, the 
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Mandells' section 338 election pertained only to the income from the sale that they 
received in 1998 and no such election was made for income beyond that received by 
the Mandells in 2001. No Finding to the contrary exists. 
Without HAU in existence in 2001, the Mandells could not have a commercial 
domicile in Utah in 2001 and, again, no Finding suggests they did. So, again, the 
Commission runs headlong into the reality that the Mandells had no connection to Utah 
in 2001. The Mandells owned no property, real or tangible, within Utah in 2001, and 
they did not carry on any business, trade, profession or occupation in Utah, as required 
by UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-117(1), argued on page 25 of the Commission's Brief, for a 
Finding of Utah Source income. Although the Commission argues that the Mandells' 
income was Utah Source income, it notably failed to make any Finding from the 
evidence of the required factual predicates for such an argument. The Commission's 
argument, that "[t]he fact that Mandell was a Utah resident in 1998 and a Utah 
non-resident in 2001 does not alter the character and nature of the settlement proceeds 
as Utah source incomef,]" Commission Brief at 29, just does not square with the plain 
language of the statute defining Utah Source income. HAU's commercial domicile in 
1998 was Utah, no question, but HAU had no commercial domicile in 2001, the tax year 
in question, and no Finding suggests otherwise. 
The Commission argues that the Mandells' settlement of the chose in action was 
"just a reallocation between Mandell and Whitworth of the proceeds from the purchase 
price." Commission Brief at 31. That makes a strongly contested fraud action sound 
like the grant of a professional courtesy. The action sought recovery of damages and 
attorney fees. There is no Finding that the settlement was "just a reallocation." In any 
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event, though, the Mandells had no presence in Utah in the tax year they received the 
income. No presence equals no taxing jurisdiction. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTION CONSTRAINS UTAH'S TAXING POWER. 
Although the Mandells believe that Utah's own statutory scheme protects them 
against any exercise of taxing jurisdiction by the Commission for tl leir 2001 ii icon le, if 
those statutes do nof, Hie (Inited States Constitution does. 
A state generally has no authority to tax the income of the residents of another 
state. The only exceptionis to tliat rule are where the income generated is the result of 
sufficient minimum contacts between the taxpayer and the state in the yeai ii i question. 
In 2001, no contacts existed between the Mandells and Utah. The Commission entered 
a Finding that the Mandells were not domiciled in Utah and made no Finding although 
the facts of record show, that the Mandells had no commercial domicile in Utah in 2001. 
The fact that the Mandells lived in Utah in 1998 and sold the shares they (leici iii the 
Utah business they owned if 11998 cannot reasonably be extended to tax them for 
income they earned in 2001, by suing a Nevada Estate in the Nevada Courts for a fraud 
that was actually committed on them in California. Due process prohibits Utah from 
taxing these Nevada residents on their 2001 income. 
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The Commission also ignores the substantial effort (let alone expense) that the 
Mandells were required to put into their Nevada litigation in order to "earn" the 
settlement they earned in 2001. The state of Utah had no stake in that litigation. Its 
Court system was not implicated, indeed, there was no burden placed upon Utah by the 
Mandells, at all. The Commerce Clause prohibits Utah from taxing these Nevada 
residents for the result of their efforts in litigating in the Nevada Courts, where Utah has 
had no stake in the litigation. 
Finally, all other states allow citizens to leave their tax burden behind when they 
move out of state, save only for select circumstances not present here. Only Utah has 
attempted to interfere with the privilege of the Mandells to move to another state free of 
the taxing burden of Utah. Utah therefore discriminates against its former residents in a 
way that no other state does. No matter where in this vast Country one moves, the 
Commission will attempt to follow. No one should have to bear the tremendous burden 
and expense that the Mandells have been subjected-to in these circumstances, to free 
themselves of the grip of the taxing authority of their former home state. Ask the 
question whether the Mandells would be fighting this issue in Utah, at all, had they 
moved to a state with an income tax higher than Utah's, rather than a state with no 
income tax. The Mandells would have paid the income tax of their new state and the 
state of Utah likely would never have made any assessment against them. Is the 
privilege to leave behind the taxing jurisdiction of your former home inapplicable where 
your new state has no income tax? That is not a decision for Utah to make. Having no 
connections to Utah in 2001, the Mandells are entitled to be free of the Utah taxing 
authorities, just like they would have been had they moved to a state that had a higher 
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income tax. 
CONCLUSION 
The Mandells had no connection to Utah in 2001. The Commission's decision 
should be reversed, the determination of deficient y quashed .md IIn• M.-indells declared 
free of Utah taxing jurisdiction for the income they earned in 2001. 
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